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1 Introduction
Usually, inmostliteratureaboutsupplychainmanagementliterature, thechoiceof
transaction form is exogenously given and hence the equilibrium is probably non-
efﬁcient as compared to the one achieved in an endogenously deﬁned transaction
formadoptedatequilibriumbythetwopartners. Someresultsofongoingresearch
are presented here which focus on the relationship between, on one side, a ﬁrm,
which will be called « the buyer » (she), who has to satisfy demand emanating
from her own downstream customers; and on the other side a provider (he) who
sells a service indispensable to the accomplishment of the buyer’s activity towards
those customers.
This service is bought through long term contracts and any additional need is
satisﬁed through some form of backup market "on the day" at "spot" prices.
The question addressed is how the buyer and provider will agree on a type of
transaction to adopt and, if a contract is retained, what will be the contract parame-
ters. Information is asymmetric: the provider does not know the characteristics of
the demand addressed to the buyer, whereas both know of the distribution function
of the spot market price.
Three types of transactions are compared and the resulting optimal parameters
derived so that Nash equilibria can emerge. The ﬁrst is the procurement using
the spot market. The second uses a contract based on minimum purchase com-
mitment and the third is a quantity ﬂexibility clause contract. In the next section,
we review relevant literature, in §3, we describe a model; in §4 we give classical
equilibria when the choice of transaction form is exogenously deﬁned, then in §5
we compare each type of transaction and deﬁne the best form given characteristics
of the distributions of spot price and demand. In §6 we give a numerical example
before concluding.
2 Literature review
Wu et al. (2002) study the contracting arrangements in energy sector between a
producer and several buyers. They derive the optimal contract parameters when
price of the input is a deterministic function of the received demand. Both buyers
and providers can take recourse in the spot market for "on the day" transactions
to satisfy their needs. Their solution involves deriving demand from spot price
or vice versa. Kleindorfer & Wu (2003) and Spinler & Huchzermeier (2005)
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markets is studied. The present paper calls upon the same modeling framework
along a three-period time line but with stochastic price and demand which may
be dependent. The focus here is on a "must-produce-must-exercise" option based
contract (called "forward contract" in Kleindorfer & Wu (2003)). Chen (2001),
in a one buyer-multiple seller model, derives an efﬁcient procurement strategy
through a comparison of two auction mechanisms. In the ﬁrst, the provider offers
a quantity given a scale of price-quantities from the buyer and in the second, the
supplier offers a price for a quantity taken from a scale of quantities provided by
the buyer. All suppliers are symmetric and the least cost supplier wins.
In all the above, the buyer must reduce unit procurement cost for a given de-
mand risk. In other words, she must ofﬂoad the risk onto the provider. Some
measure of ﬂexibility in capacity has to be introduced. In Moinzadeh & Nahmias
(2000) that same general problem is treated: Q, the minimum commitment per pe-
riod is given and there are both ﬁxed and proportional penalties for adjustments,
over an inﬁnite horizon. The authors contend, but do not formally prove, that a
type of order-up-to policy (s,S) is optimal. In that model, the ﬁxed delivery con-
tract with penalties serves as a risk sharing mechanism. In our model, because the
demand, when realized, directly results in a buying requirement, there can be no
time-ﬂexibility arrangements as those described in the literature (Li & Kouvelis,
1999). In our approach, production capacities are not freely substitutable, ruling
out "overbooking" (Karaesmen & van Ryzin, 2002).
Seifert et al. (2004) studies a model of spot markets for commodities that
can be stocked and are subject to obsolescence and quick price ﬂuctuations. We
inspire ourselves from this paper to model the procurement strategy for the spot
market. Themostsigniﬁcantresultisthatproﬁtimprovementscanbeachievedifa
moderate fraction of the commodity demand (in our case this is our input demand)
is procured via the spot market. In this paper, both the demand addressed to the
buyer and the price of the commodity can vary. However, commodities can be
salvaged which is not part of our model.
Lariviere (1999) models several types of contracts in a newsvendor setting
with demand as a stochastic process. The purpose is to achieve an efﬁciency level
as close as possible to the efﬁciency of a centralized organization. The players do
not engage in negotiation of the contracts or parameters.
Corbett & Tang (1999) study three common types of contracts, each a special
case of the next: the basic wholesale-pricing scheme, a two-part linear scheme
with ﬁxed wholesale price and side payment, and a two-part nonlinear scheme
with wholesale price and side payment depending on quantity purchased. The
best contract is deﬁned given information asymmetry scenarios but all modelsComparing procurement strategies 4
share the same deterministic demand assumption.
Tsay et al. (1999) review and classify several types of contracts, however all
involve goodsthat canbestocked andbacklogged. Quantityﬂexibility clausesand
minimum purchase commitments are established as coordinating mechanisms in
a supply chain.
Cachon&Lariviere(2001)drawsattentionontheinformationimbalancepreva-
lent in most supply chains which has special consequences when the supplier is
hamstrung by tight capacity and varying contract compliance (full or voluntary on
the provider’s part). That paper studies contracts that allow the supply chain to
align incentives, correcting these imbalances. In their setting, the buyer solicits
the provider for too much capacity so as to be able to meet more than the aver-
age expected demand. The provider must contrive a contract which enables the
buyer to credibly signal the necessary capacity. The results proven in Cachon &
Lariviere (2001) are: the supply chain is better coordinated under assumption of
asymmetric information when both players set up a ﬁrm commitment for capacity
for which the buyer promises to pay a lump sum upon realization of demand.
Bassok & Anupindi (1997), later revisited in Anupindi & Bassok (1998) and
elaborately discussed in Tsay & Lovejoy (1999), Tsay (1999), describes in detail
the contract model which inspires us here: the total minimum quantity commit-
ment where a buyer guarantees that his cumulative orders across all periods in
the planning horizon will exceed a speciﬁed minimum quantity. In this model,
a single product is studied; excess product can be stored and unsatisﬁed demand
can be backlogged. No secondary source for the product is included. The solu-
tion is a bootstrap of a stochastic dynamic program. We have added to the basic
description of this contract in this paper an incentive that ensures coordination in
the supply chain.
To explain the choice of the three forms of contracts used here, the reader
can refer to the arguments developed in Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) which give
examples of use of similar contracts in industry and states "clearly, channel co-
ordination is always achieved when the buyer is able to internalize the costs of
the supplier". The provider in our setting speciﬁcally suffers from constrained
capacity and a ﬁxed plus variable cost for operating this capacity. Moreover, be-
cause the demand, when realized, directly results in a product requirement, there
can be no time-ﬂexibility arrangements 1 as those described in the literature Li &
Kouvelis (1999). Plambeck & Taylor (2003) and Plambeck & Taylor (2005) give
1The carrier can tell his customer: "Your order is too big for our available capacity today, we
can still provide you next-day service at a discount."Comparing procurement strategies 5
an extensive discussion of a game of repeated informal trade agreements where
both members of the supply chain have to negotiate investment into productive
capacity ahead of demand under diverse assumptions of information asymmetry.
3 Description of the model
3.1 General setting with bivariate output demand and input
price
In the present model, both buyer and provider are price takers. Contrary to the
energy markets described in Wu et al. (2002), service markets are not well orga-
nized (for example, the freight matching exchanges never really took off), so we
model information as being sparse and costly.
As opposed to most newsvendor settings, the contracted service cannot be
backlogged. Further, no storage, holding or shortage costs are incurred. The sup-
ply lead time is assumed to be zero. The provider cannot deliver less than the
amount ordered by the buyer if he has available capacity to produce this amount:
he works under a regime of forced compliance (Cachon, 2004), which means that
the supplier delivers the amount not to exceed the retailer’s order that maximizes
her proﬁt given the terms of the contract; so the possibility of the provider volun-
tarily restraining his delivered quantity to the buyer is not contemplated. Further-
more, the service that has to be delivered is produced through capacity constrained
equipment.
Thenon-storabilityaspectofthisproblemgivesrisetotheso-calledtwo-goods
problem: contracted, available capacity at a given price and additional capacity at
another price (different conditions). This setting is also related to the problem
of the producer producing two goods in a joint production process and choosing
between technologies with different costs and cost structures. This could typically
be the case of the provider sub-contracting capacity from third parties to offer it
to the buyer in a bid to increase service quality. The key issue we study here
is how spot pricing and bilateral contracting are or should be linked. From the
provider’s perspective, pre-committing capacity at a ﬁxed price may exclude more
proﬁtable opportunities through the spot market on the day. The same is true for
the buyer. The key trade-off in determining how such contracts should be priced
and how much capacity should be committed to them by providers and buyers are
the relative costs and risks of sourcing from the contract versus the spot market.
We assume that the buyer faces an independent, identically distributed exoge-Comparing procurement strategies 6
nous demand Q that has a continuous at least twice differentiable unimodal distri-
bution Fq(Q) on non-negative reals with density fq(Q), mean µq and variance σ2
q.
The spot market price of service capacity P is also assumed to be an independent,
identically distributed exogenous variable following a continuous, twice differ-
entiable, unimodal distribution Fp(P) on non-negative reals with density fp(P),
mean µp and variance σ2
p. The spot market price is assumed to be uninﬂuenced
by either the provider or the buyer. We are facing a two-stage stochastic decision
process. The buyer’s residual demand not covered by the long-term contract is re-
solved by buying additional capacity from the spot market at the day’s spot price.
The spot price may vary but is assumed to stay above the variable cost v of offer-
ing the service as neither the provider nor any other provider of similar service in
the market would sell under this common variable cost. In the same way, let us
call F the continuous, twice-differentiable joint unimodal distribution and f the
joint density function of P and Q with mean µ and variance σ2.
The mean and standard deviation of demand is assumed to be private knowl-
edge of the buyer. The information about the spot market price, mean, variance
and distribution is assumed to be common knowledge.
Along the time-line, events happen in the following order. First, the buyer
knows of the future demand she has to satisfy. She turns to the provider and
negotiates a contract for capacity. Some parameters of the contract are agreed
upon. Then, at each period (say every day), demand and spot price are revealed
and buyer calls upon sufﬁcient quantity of service from the provider to meet the
demand addressed to her. If the committed capacity by contract is insufﬁcient,
within the same period, she turns to the spot market and buys additional service
at the going spot price. Finally, service and payout are performed within the same
period.
3.2 Types of contracts
Two types of contract are used and the utility they provide is compared with the
one resulting from the alternative of procuring all service capacity from the spot
market. One key difference with other models using contracts and spot markets
is that the process of buying capacity from the spot market is assumed to entail
a higher cost than the one attributed with contract buying. This is due to the fact
that information gathering, service quality and price discovery all have a cost sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the transaction cost involved in buying from the contracted
provider. This helps to steer away from trivial situations where the buyer might be
always better off by buying capacity from the spot market since by essence, this isComparing procurement strategies 7
the market where overall excess capacity by all providers is offered. Under weak
regulatory assumptions, it is straightforward to show that the provider’s optimal
strategy is to bid his unit marginal production cost, meaning the variable cost in
our model. By essence, this spot market will be cleared by a spot price close to the
marginal cost of operating all available capacity among providers. However, two
factors impede the spot price from equating the variable cost. One factor results
from tensions due to high demand from buyers (take for instance the case of the
wheat harvest having to be carried by truck to silo facilities in countries where the
railroad infrastructure is insufﬁcient). The other factor stems from market opacity
and information cost that impede the perfect clearing of all bids and offers at the
most efﬁcient price.
The objective functions for the buyer and provider under three settings are
described: spot procurement, a minimum purchase commitment contract and a
contract with single price but with quantity ﬂexibility clause. In each case, the
objective functions when both demand and spot price vary are spelt out. We then
compare each contract to spot buying in order to present insights on the alternative
open to the buyer before contracting.
3.3 spot procurement
The buyer’s objective function is a cost function which can be modeled as:
V1(Q,P) = U(Q) − PQ − I (1)
where U is the utility function for the buyer and I (I > 0) is the transaction cost
differential between spot market and contract mechanisms that affects both buyer
and provider. The provider’s objective function is a proﬁt function which can be
modeled as
π1(Q,P) = PQ − V Q − C − I (2)
where V is the variable cost for producing quantity Q, C is the ﬁxed cost at-
tributed to operating the service capacity. The provider will be considered here
to have only one technology at his disposal and hence that his production facil-
ity is homogeneous which simpliﬁes ﬁxed cost attribution. Using the properties
of the expectation of the product of two random variables and assuming that the
utility function is an additive function, the expected values for the buyer can be





= U(µq) − Cov(Q,P) − E(Q)E(P) − I





= Cov(Q,P) + µqµp − V µq − C − I. (4)
Observe that the higher the covariance of spot and demand, the higher the proﬁt
to the provider! This, among other reasons, explains why providers’ proﬁts in
niche markets are dependent both upon the existence of tight capacity niche-wide
(which causes volatility of the spot price for this capacity) and of high demand
volatility. In point of fact, lifting the capacity constraint, through new players
entering the market or through existing players adding capacity, may be uneco-
nomical in the short term because of the high volatility of the marginal revenue.
3.4 Minimum purchase commitment contract
The minimum purchase commitment as studied in Cachon & Lariviere (2001),
consists in a ﬁxed fee r that the buyer agrees to pay the provider each period pro-
portionate to an agreed capacity committed q and a variable fee c for each unit
effectively bought in the period. The ﬁxed fee is paid whether the buyer uses the
capacity or not. As proven in Cachon & Lariviere (2001), it is a coordinating
mechanism to ensure that the buyer (who has private information on the demand
she will face before the contract is signed) will not over-estimate the service ne-
cessity and that she will use it independently from the level of the spot price. This
mechanism differs from the one exposed in Wu et al. (2002). There, the buyer can
still take advantage of the spot market when the spot price is less than the variable
part of the two-part tariff in the contract. The contract described is also called a
two-part tariff for minimum commitment purchase. In the present model, as op-
posed to Cachon & Lariviere (2001), the buyer can still complement his realized
demand from the provider if this demand exceeds the committed quantity to be
bought. As exempliﬁed in Seifert et al. (2004), in the present model this excess
demand is paid at the going spot market price. There is no clear cut connection
between the contract modeled here and the expected transfer payment of the con-
tract in Cachon & Lariviere (2001), but the gist of the mechanism is reﬂected,Comparing procurement strategies 9
namely a lump sum payment plus a variable rate per item. This is justiﬁed by the
adaptation of this form of payment to the real cost structure of the provider (ﬁxed
cost plus variable cost).
The sequence of operations is the following. At ﬁrst the buyer knows of future
demand she must address. This information is private to her but she signals to
the provider about the expected level by asking for capacity equal to the expected
demand. Both she and the provider share knowledge as to average and standard
deviation of the spot market price. So she negotiates with the provider a contract.
Parameters are agreed upon: r,q,c. Then demand and the spot market price are
realized. The buyer buys the necessary good from the provider who delivers.
Payout occurs.
We can write:
V2(Q,P) = U(Q) − r − max(q,Q)c − (Q − q)
+P (5)
where (Q − q)+ denotes that if Q < q then (Q − q)+ = 0 and Q − q otherwise.
For the provider:
π2(Q,P) = r + max(q,Q)c + (Q − q)
+P − V Q − C. (6)
The provider can still sell additional capacity to the buyer at the going spot price
of the day if received demand exceeds the minimum capacity committed.
We will consider in the following that the expected utility to the buyer of
the demand can be written E(U(Q)). The expected proﬁt to the provider and
value to the buyer are functions of q,c,r, contract parameters which become the
decision variables of both buyer and provider. We deﬁne g(P,Q) = P(Q − q)
and a function ϕ(.). From the deﬁnition of the conditional distribution and of
conditional expected values,











= E(U(Q)) − r − cµq(q) − ϕ(q) (8)




= r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q) − V µq − C. (9)Comparing procurement strategies 10
The interesting variable to determine is the optimal quantity q∗, object of the com-
mitment. We now see what this optimal capacity is.
3.4.1 Discrete distribution
Without loss of generality, it can be considered that the continuous distribution
functions are in fact extensions from discrete functions in the real world.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of the optimal q). If there exist optimal quantities




∗ − µq) = pq(q
∗+ 1)(q
∗+ 1 − µq), (10)
where pq is the marginal discrete probability function of the demand.
See appendix A for the proof.
We see that solving this equation very much looks like ﬁnding the root to
a differential equation where the step, which is here set to one, is a quantity h
which tends to zero.
Going back, if we take the discrete distribution to have a step of h, we still get
to the same result. So to achieve a result that is applicable to a continuous density
function, we let h tend to zero.
We can formalize it as a function g
(
g(x) = fq(x)(x − µq), x ≥ 0
g(x) = 0, x < 0
(11)
with fq(.) and µq as previously deﬁned. To solve (10), we need but look for the








∗ − µq) + fq(q
∗) = 0 (12)
Lemma Even when both demand and price of a necessary input ﬂuctu-
ate, the optimum quantity to be contracted is independent from the price of that
input. The optimal quantities satisfy the equation (10) when the distribution of the
quantity is discrete and (12) when it is continuous.Comparing procurement strategies 11
3.4.2 Instance using normal and exponential distributions
Different distribution functions yield different results for optimal q∗. The normal
distribution of Q yields two roots:
q
∗
1 = µq − σq q
∗
2 = µq + σq (13)
The exponential distribution yields just one root:
q
∗ = 2µq. (14)
3.5 Quantity ﬂexibility contract
In the same way as described in Bassok & Anupindi (1997), we can write the ob-
jective and expected objective functions when the contract is for a variable price
m but the buyer signs for multi period minimum quantity commitment. To ensure
coordination, as mentioned in the literature review (Chen, 2004), we include a
mechanism which limits the buyer from contracting a too high committed min-
imum quantity. This is represented in our model by a penalty θ. This penalty
cannot be higher than the expected spot price µp nor higher than m or the buyer
would not enter into such a contract. Let t be the number of periods over which
the committed quantity W has to be purchased; the game has to be repeated t
times.
In the ﬁrst case, there is a number of periods, lower or equal than t, during
which W has been purchased. The recourse for the buyer is to purchase additional
quantities from the supplier or from the spot market at the revealed going spot
price Pi in period i and during j additional periods within the total t. She chooses
to transact with the supplier since these later transactions do not face the added
information cost I that characterizes transactions on the spot market since both
parties already know each other and the spot price is assumed to be common
information to both parties.
In the second case, when the buyer underestimates the demand she receives,
she has to pay a penalty θ times the quantity shortfall.
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Let a function Ψ describe the evolution of this part of the proﬁt function for both
buyer and supplier. It is discussed in B and is deﬁned in (51).
Given that all periods of the game are symmetric in terms of the expected
outcome and that each demand outcome is i.i.d. w.r. to the others and the spot
prices are also i.i.d. w. r. to the other spot prices, the buyer’s and supplier’s

















0 ≤ θ < m (16)
The longer the contract (higher t), the lower the variance of the sum of expected
demands, reducing the impact of both penalty and spot prices. At the limit,when
lim
t→∞µY(W,t) = 0,
which effectively means that both supplier and buyer will be indifferent to the
level of θ because they won’t need it! It is interesting to discuss the behaviour of
Ψ when W, µq and t are "proportional": for example when W = tµq.
Given that the players have incurred sunk investments in their relationship,
they both aim to increase the length of the contract. The partial differentials in t















= + mµq +
Ψ(W,θ,t)
∂t
− cµq − K ≥ 0
(17)Comparing procurement strategies 13








cµq + K + ∂Ψ(W,θ,t)/∂t
µq
(18)
Proposition 1. For the QFC to be chosen by both supplier and buyer, the contract
parameters m, W, θ, t must meet the following conditions

         
         
t  0










4 Helping buyer and provider to choose a sourcing
strategy
Should the buyer enter into a contract or just choose short term spot market buy-
ing? If she chooses the contract, at what parameters so that, to her, the outcome is
not worse than sticking with the spot market?
We can now compare the different forms of transactions. Let us start with the
comparison of the minimum purchase commitment (MPC) and spot, we then
will compare the Quantity Flexibility contract (QFC) with the spot; ﬁnally, we
compare both contracts.
It must be pointed out here that the restriction on the utility function having to
be distributive over the sum can be relaxed since it does not appear again in the
following comparisons and it does not change the results which are used here.
4.1 Minimum commitment versus spot
The difference between the expected values to the buyer of the MPC and spot to
the buyer is labeled D2−1, it is a function of the contract parameters c, q and rComparing procurement strategies 14

















= −Cov(Q,P) − µqµp + I + r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q). (20)
We are interested in the sign of this difference so as to decide which procurement
strategy is best. Here the interests of provider and buyer go in opposite direction
except for the cost of information.
Theorem 2 (Conditions for choosing MPC over spot). For both parties to choose
the MPC means that the contract parameters must satisfy
  Cov(Q,P) + µqµp − r − cµq(q∗) − ϕ(q∗)
  ≤ I
f0
q(q∗)(q∗ − µq) + fq(q∗) = 0 (21)
As can be seen, the higher the covariance of spot price and demand, the higher
the contract cost to entering a contract for both parties. This is a rational justiﬁ-
cation to the observed practice in the market for transport services. Shippers will
more often stick with the spot market when the volatilities observed in the spot
price and demand are small compared to the information cost.
If the buyer chose the contract, she would choose the optimal quantity q∗ de-
ﬁned in (12); replacing in (20), we derive the necessary conditions on r and c:
Cov(Q,P) + µqµp + I − cµq(q
∗) − ϕ(q
∗) ≥ r
Cov(Q,P) + µqµp − I − cµq(q
∗) − ϕ(q















These closed segments are the restricted values that {r,c} can take for the contract
to be elected. Any value outside of these segments will result in each player
choosing a different form of transaction. The segments are proportional to the
information cost. The higher this cost, the larger the segment. If the information
cost is null, just one value can satisfy choosing the contract over the spot market.Comparing procurement strategies 15
4.2 Quantity ﬂexibility versus spot
We have to ﬁnd when the buyer is indifferent to signing a quantity ﬂexibility
contract or buying from the spot market. Let us call D3−1 the function in terms
of t, W and θ of the difference between both expected values over t periods. We
are again interested in deﬁning when this function is positive or negative. We
distinguish between cases when the contracted committed capacity is less than
the expected demands and the case when the contracted commitment is higher or
equal to the expected demand.












Cov(Q,P) + µqµp + I

− mtµq − Ψ(W,θ,t) (24)
which is dependent on m, t and θ.





I − Cov(Q,P) − µqµp

+ mtµq + Ψ(W,θ,t); (25)
which, except for the information cost, is the exact opposite from what the buyer
is aiming for. In practical terms, for both players to choose the contract means
that we need to have both (24) and (25) positive.
The only region when the players will choose the contract over spot market
trading is when these expected differences are of identical signs. Because t > 0,
the values of θ which satisfy this condition are
1
t
   − Cov(Q,P) − µqµp + mµq + tΨ(W,θ,t)
   ≤ I. (26)
The other condition which would otherwise lead the buyer to refuse the con-
tract (seen when presenting the contract in 3.5), is that θ < m. We enounce the
theorem
Theorem 3 (Conditions for choosing QFC over spot). For both players to choose
the Quantity Flexibility Commitment over the spot market, the following condi-
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Any "large" value on t will push the players to choose the contract over spot
market transactions because the overall variance of the sum of demands will be
low, reducing the need to have high penalties. The range of values available is
once again proportionate to the information cost I. If information about prices
and providers was costless, decision variables would have just one equilibrium
value for the contract to be selected.
The higher the value of t, the bigger the incentive.
If these conditions are not met, the contract will not be retained; the players
will choose to transact their business through the spot market paying the informa-
tion cost.
4.3 Deciding between a QFC and a MPC contract
We now try to help the buyer choose between both, given the conditions in spot
price and demand she receives. Let us call D3−2 the difference between QFC and
MPC in terms of all the decision variables.








= t(r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q)) − mtµq − Ψ(W,θ,t) (28)
In the same way, from (9) and (15), we get
D
p





3−2(q,c,m,r,t,W,θ) < 0, which means that if the buyer chooses the
MPC, the provider will choose the QFC and vice versa. The only possible equi-






This means that for both to choose the same contract, both contracts have to offer
the same expected proﬁts to each of the players.
From the preceding theorems, for a transaction form to be chosen the follow-Comparing procurement strategies 17
ing set of inequations and equations have to be solved

      
      
mµq + Ψ(W,θ,t) = r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q)
f0





Additionally, the following conditions have also to be met for a contract to be
chosen as opposed to the spot market: (1), (21) and (26).
We have now proved that these are no trivial values and that they depend on
the terms of the bivariate distributions and the cost of information.
Theorem 4 (Conditions for choosing QFC over MPC). For a contract to be re-
tained versus the price-only relational form and then for the QFC to be chosen
over the MPC, the following conditions have to be met:

              
              
mµq + Ψ(W,θ,t) = r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q)
f0






   − Cov(Q,P) − µqµp + mµq + tΨ(W,θ,t)
   ≤ I
m ≤ 1
µq (U(µq) + ∂Ψ(W,θ,t)/∂t)
m ≥ 1
µq (cµq + K + ∂Ψ(W,θ,t)/∂t).
(31)
5 Numerical example
To illustrate graphically the results a numerical example is offered. Let f(Q,P)
be a bivariate normal distribution with the following characteristics:
µq = 10, σq = 3, µp = 5, σp = 2, ρ = 0.5,
the other relevant parameters are
v = 2, I = 2.Comparing procurement strategies 18
As a consequence, we have
Cov(Q,P) = ρσqσp = 3
µqµp = 50 (32)
The information cost is supported in every period and represents in this example
a non-negligible cost compared to the average spot market price. This means that
using the spot market induces an overall cost to the buyer 40% higher than what
the apparent cost is (the spot price). This fact is often unrecognized in organiza-
tions where full administrative costs are not well accounted for.
5.1 Parameters coming form the comparison between MPC
and spot
From (10), we have two possible values for q∗: q∗ = µq − σq = 7, q∗ =
µq + σq = 13
5.1.1 Case when q∗ = 13
The possible choice between MPC and spot means that the parameters r,c have
to fulﬁll the following condition from (21):
|51.2755 − 7.68787c − r| ≤ 2 (33)
which is represented as the grey area in ﬁgure 1. As r must be positive (which
provider would want to pay the buyer for using his capacity?), we see that c <
(51.2755 − 2)/7.68787. In the case when c = (51.2755 − 2)/7.68787, r = 0,
meaning that the ﬁxed fee can be brought to 0 because the variable rate paid by
the buyer is sufﬁcient for the provider to want to retain the contract. The width
of the range between both lines in gray in ﬁgure 1 increases as the information
cost. Taking another angle, if demand and spot price are more strongly correlated
(ρ → 1), the whole range in grey shifts "upwards", meaning that both r and c have
to be increased for the contract to be retained.
5.1.2 Case when q∗ = 7
In this case, from (21), we get:
|34.323 − 0.860977c − r| ≤ 2 (34)Comparing procurement strategies 19
Figure 1: ρ = 0.5,q∗ = 13, r must be in the gray area between both lines
The ﬁgure 2 represents the area thus delimited. When comparing the optimal sets
of parameters for both values of q∗, one sees that the other parameters have to be
set higher for the higher q∗ reﬂecting the higher possibility of the buyer not being




Both buyer and provider have an interest in choosing a "large" t. Let us take
t = 10. Since W is a function of the number of periods. We choose W ∗ = 100 as
equal to tµq. From (26) we get
(
(10/(10 − 3))(3 + 50 − 2 − 10m) − 1.7828 ≤ θ
(10/(10 − 3))(3 + 50 + 2 − 10m) − 1.7828 ≥ θ
(35)
Completed with constraint on m (16), this gives an area for θ as shown in grey in
ﬁgure 3.Comparing procurement strategies 20
Figure 2: when q∗ = 7, c and r have to be higher for a contract to be signed
5.3 ParameterscomingfromthecomparisonbetweenQFCand
MPC
We now come to the comparison between both contracts, QFC and MPC. The
conditions to be fulﬁlled are given in (31).
Bear in mind that if a contract is to be chosen, then it also has to dominate
the outcome from using the spot market. The solutions for an optimal q∗ = 7 are
presented, but the same could have been done for q∗ = 13.
5.3.1 Case when q∗ = 7
The set of conditions becomes

   
   
10m + Ψ(100,θ,10) − r − (µq(7))c − ϕ(7) = 0
|34.323 − 0.860977c − r| ≤ 2
|51.8 − 10m − 0.7(1.7828 + θ)| ≤ 2
c > 0, m > 0, r > 0, 0 < θ < m.
(36)
Solving using mathematical software 2, we get 16 sets of possible equilibria. Val-
ues of c progressively increase from a low of 0.4324 to a high of 431.227. We
2In this case Mathematica c 
 5.1 from Wolfram ResearchComparing procurement strategies 21
Figure 3: QFC vs spot: possible values for {m,θ} are in grey
give below the conditions for two sets of equilibria for the lowest and the highest
values of c.

           




0 < c ≤ 0.4324
36.319 − 0.8609c ≤ r < 36.342 − 0.08428c
1.624 + 0.08044c + 0.09491r < m ≤ 36.321 − 0.8609r 
 
 
401.695 < c < 431.227
0 < r < 36.355 − 0.0843c
1.6243 + 0.08046c + 0.09346r < m ≤ 36.323 − 0.861r
θ = 24.83 + 1.230c − 14.29m + 1.429r
(37)




5.019 < m < 5.370 ⇒ m = 5.25
θ = 1.713 (38)
The choice of m is only a matter of power in the relationship between buyer and
provider since overall proﬁt of the supply chain is equal.Comparing procurement strategies 22

















Both contracts have higher value than the spot market in the given conditions of
demand and spot price distributions.
6 Conclusion
The results established are resumed in table 1 on page 31. Contrarily to con-
clusions expressed in the literature which commonly center on just one form of
contractorondeterministicdemandorinputprice, theoutcomeofachoiceofcon-
tracts leads to very different equilibria altogether. We have formally established
how, in an environment of uncertain input prices and uncertain demand and when
information is at a premium and asymmetric, the decisions to enter into contracts
are taken.
The utility function of the buyer has no inﬂuence on the choice she makes as to
the transaction form she ultimately chooses: she can be risk averse or risk neutral
and still come to the same contractual engagement.
This paper has also established that the contract parameters in a minimum
purchase contract, where both input price and demand can vary, are not related to
the variance of the price of the necessary input but solely on demand distribution
characteristics.
In the process, clear motivations for both provider and buyer to set up formal
contractual engagements have been presented.
It is hoped that the material developed here will help to focus future research
into the exploration and discussion of alternative supply chain transaction settings
in which provider and buyer can interact.
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A Deﬁning the optimal commitment
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1 in 3.4.1 on page 10


























What is the optimum quantity q that the buyer has to contract? If this optimum q∗
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(y + c)p(x,y) ≤ 0.(43)
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(y +c)p(x,y) ≤ 0. (44)














(y + c)p(x,y) ≤ c(pq(q
∗+ 1)(q
∗+ 1 − µq) + 1). (45)
Again, without loss of generality, we can safely consider that the “step” in the
increaseofthediscreteprobabilityfunctionpq canbenarrowedtoanhstep, which













Applying this result to (45), we can join both inequalities and since c > 0 by
construction, this leads us to an inequality independent from the spot price P:
pq(q
∗)(q
∗ − µq) ≤ pq(q
∗+ 1)(q
∗+ 1 − µq). (46)
To resume, if this inequality is satisﬁed, then q∗ exists. We can loosely interpret
this inequality as saying that the absolute value of the slope of the probability
mass function probability (which can be extended back to the original density
function) be higher than the slope of the line that goes through both (µq,pq(µq))
and (q∗,pq(q∗)).
Let us focus on the optimal q for the provider. Since he wants to maximize
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Which is the opposite inequality from (43) encountered in the case of the buyer.




∗ − µq) = pq(q
∗+ 1)(q
∗+ 1 − µq). (48)
B Evaluating the expected penalties in a QFC
Proof. To evaluate the dispersion of demands around W, we need to calculate
the variance of the sum of demands within a game. Because demand is a station-
ary stochastic process and its outcomes are i.i.d., its sum over t periods is also a
stationary process, and its variance is ﬁnite, whatever the law of X. Let us call
Yt =
Pt





Let us call fY(.) and FY the pdf and cdf of this normal distribution.
We can classify outcomes of this linear process according to whether the sum
of demands is higher or lower than W. The lower sums (YL) will be the basis for
the calculation of the penalty due to the supplier and the sums of YH that exceed
W will be the basis for the calculation of the demand that has to be served at spot
prices.
The buyer is interested in minimizing the impact of both the demand she has
to satisfy by buying from the spot market and the penalty she has to pay when
demand falls short. Let us name the conditional means of sums of demands being
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this is simply having to minimize the function Ψ such that
Ψ(W,θ,t) = θµY(W,t) + P(W,t)µ
1
Y(W,t). (51)
This function is continuous and twice differentiable in both θ and W by deﬁnition
of the gaussian distribution, whatever the bivariate distribution of both demand
and spot price. The ﬁrst differential in θ is independent of the exact distribution of





















































The graph of this function in ﬁgure 4 exhibits a clear ridge through W = tµq,
and this is the case even for all variance levels up to or equal to the mean demand.
When W < tµq, the differential is close to 0, meaning that the Ψ function does
not exhibit much inﬂuence from the penalty levied when capacity commitment
is under the expected demand. However, once W > tµq, then the differential
stabilizes at a new plateau, meaning that the function Ψ is directly proportional to
the penalty.






served at spot prices are as low as possible. Evidently, if both the penalty and the
conditional spot prices had the same value, since by deﬁnition, the mean of a
gaussian distribution is centered, we would have
W
∗ = tµq, (54)Comparing procurement strategies 30
Figure 4: Differential of Ψ in θ, with t = 10, σq = µq.Comparing procurement strategies 31
Condition Buyer Provider Outcome
 Cov(Q,P) + µqµp − r − cµq(q∗) − ϕ(q∗)
  ≤ I
f0
q(q∗)(q∗ − µq) + fq(q∗) = 0 MPC MPC MPC
n  0
W | max(W < tµq)




  − Cov(Q,P) − µqµp + mµq + tΨ(W,θ,t)

  ≤ I
m ≤ 1
µq (U(µq) + ∂Ψ(W,θ,t)/∂t)
m ≥ 1
µq (cµq + K + ∂Ψ(W,θ,t)/∂t)

Cov(Q,P) + µqµp − r − cµq(q∗) − ϕ(q∗)

 ≤ I
mµq + Ψ(W,θ,t) = r + cµq(q) + ϕ(q)
f0
q(q)(q − µq) + fq(q) = 0




 − Cov(Q,P) − µqµp + mµq + tΨ(W,θ,t)

  ≤ I
θ < m
t  0
S=spot market, QFC=Quantity Flexibility Clause, MPC=Minimum purchase commitment
Table 1: Table of outcomes and conditions on the different parameters, in all other
cases the spot is preferred